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CIRCUIT CITY STORES, INC. V. ADAMS: THE DEBATE OVER
ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS IN THE EMPLOYMENT
CONTEXT RAGES ON
INTRODUCTION
Fueling the already fiercely debated issue of arbitration agreements
in the employment context, the United States Supreme Court reaffirmed
an "emphatic federal policy"1 favoring arbitration with its March 2001
decision in Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams.2 The subject of much de-
bate, this issue has divided the courts and scholars alike. Over the past
few decades, the Supreme Court has clearly favored arbitration outside
the employment context.3 Yet, until Circuit City, the law was unclear as
to whether businesses could require their employees to resolve legal dis-
putes through arbitration and forego the opportunity to seek redress in
court.
Using a textual analysis to narrowly interpret the statutory language
at issue, the Circuit City Court ruled on this unresolved, and frequently
litigated, issue.4 The Court held that only a narrow category of employ-
ees, interstate transportation workers, are exempt from the Federal Arbi-
tration Act ("FAA").5 As such, all other employment contracts contain-
ing agreements to arbitrate are enforceable and fall within the scope of
the FAA.6 This decision raises concern among critics who argue that
arbitration agreements are inherently unfair and inappropriate for resolv-
ing employment disputes.
1. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 631 (1985).
2. 532 U.S. 105, 119 (2001).
3. See, e.g., Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 82 (2000) (holding that an
arbitration agreement's silence with respect to arbitration fees and costs does not render it
unenforceable); Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528, 541 (1995)
(holding that the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 46 U.S.C. § 1303(8), does not invalidate foreign
arbitration clauses in bills of lading); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 23
(1991) (holding that claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act can be the subject of
compulsory arbitration clauses in securities registration applications); Rodriguez de Quijas v.
Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 481 (1989) (holding that claims under the Securities Act
of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 771(2), are arbitrable via pre-dispute arbitration agreements and overruling
Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953)); Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 234
(1987) (holding that claims under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78(b), are
arbitrable via pre-dispute arbitration agreements); Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 636 (holding that
international antitrust claims are arbitrable via pre-dispute arbitration agreements); Southland Corp.
v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16 (1984) (holding that state law purporting to invalidate arbitration
agreements in franchise contracts violated the Supremacy Clause).
4. Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 111.
5. Id. at 119.
6. Id.
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This comment begins by outlining the facts and procedural history
of Circuit City, including the arguments raised by the respondent em-
ployee and the Court's short-order treatment of those challenges. Part II
discusses the history of the Federal Arbitration Act, key Supreme Court
decisions that shaped the current pro-arbitration climate, and arguments
for and against arbitration of employment disputes. Part I contains an
analysis of the Circuit City holding, specifically addressing the Court's
justification for its decision and the methods of interpretation the Court
employed. Part IV considers the practical effects of the Circuit City rul-
ing and provides an in-depth look at some of the criticisms flowing from
it.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In October 1995, Saint Clair Adams applied for a job at Circuit
City, Inc. ("Circuit City"), a nationwide electronics retail chain.7 The
employment application Adams signed contained an arbitration provision
which bound Adams to "settle any and all previously unasserted claims,
disputes or controversies arising out of or relating to [his] application or
candidacy for employment, employment and/or cessation of employment
with Circuit City, exclusively by final and binding arbitration before a
neutral Arbitrator."'8
Circuit City's Santa Rosa, California store hired Adams as a sales
counselor.9 Two years later, Adams sued Circuit City in state court for
employment discrimination "stemming from harassment based on his
sexual orientation."'10 The company responded with a suit in federal dis-
trict court to compel arbitration.1 The district court concluded that Ad-
ams was obligated to submit his claims against Circuit City to binding
arbitration pursuant to the arbitration agreement.' 2 Adams then appealed
to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which found
in his favor.' 3 The Ninth Circuit ruled that all employment contracts were
beyond the reach of the FAA, and, since "the arbitration agreement in
this case was an employment contract," the FAA was inapplicable.' 4 This
decision, while not surprising considering the Ninth Circuit's distaste for
7. Id. at 109.
8. Idat 109-10.
9. Id. at 110.
10. The Supreme Court, 2000 Term-Leading Cases, 115 HARV. L. REV. 507, 509 (2001)
[hereinafter Leading Cases].
11. Circuit City, 532 U:S. at 110.
12. Id.
13. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 194 F.3d 1070, 1071 (9th Cir. 1999).
14. Circuit City, 194 F.3d at 1071.
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arbitration, 5 was noteworthy because it "conflict[ed] with every other
Court of Appeals to have addressed the question.'
' 6
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in order to con-
clusively resolve the question of whether the FAA was applicable in the
employment context. 17 Rejecting the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of the
FAA, as well as Adams' arguments about the inappropriateness of arbi-
tration for resolving employment disputes, 18 the Supreme Court held that
the FAA does apply to employment contracts, and, furthermore, that it
would not tolerate the notion "that the advantages of the arbitration proc-
ess somehow disappear when transferred to the employment context.'"'
9
II. BACKGROUND
A. History of the Federal Arbitration Act and Key Supreme Court Deci-
sions
Despite initial skepticism, the United States Supreme Court has
"rigorously upheld the enforceability of arbitration clauses" over the past
decade.20 Congress enacted the Federal Arbitration Act2' ("FAA" or the
"Act") in 1925, and in it the United States Supreme Court found "an
'emphatic federal policy in favor of arbitral dispute resolution,,, 22 giving
arbitration agreements practical enforceability.23
The FAA makes agreements to arbitrate enforceable for both exist-
ing controversies and future disputes. 24 The primary substantive provi-
15. This case provided the Ninth Circuit with an opportunity to reiterate its anti-arbitration
stance, expressing again its preference for broadly interpreting § 1 to exclude all employment
contracts from the scope of the FAA. See Craft v. Campbell Soup Co., 177 F.3d 1083, 1094 (9th Cir.
1999) (holding, in a decision issued while the Circuit City appeal was pending, that the FAA is
inapplicable to labor or employment contracts).
16. Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 111 (citing cases from the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth,
Sixth, Seventh, Tenth, and District of Columbia Circuit).
17. Id.atilO-11.
18. Adams argued that the FAA does not apply because, according to language in § 2 of the
FAA, the Act is limited to commercial contracts involving interstate commerce. He contended that
an employment contract, such as his, was not a contract within the scope of the FAA. Id. at 113.
19. Id. at 119, 123.
20. David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Business: Employee and
Consumer Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 Wis. L. REV. 33, 54, 73-74.
Original skepticism can be traced back to English common law courts' opposition to anything that
threatened to deprive them of jurisdiction. American courts initially adopted this attitude. Allied-
Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265,270 (1995).
21. Pub. L. No. 68-401, Chap. 213, 43 Stat. 883 (reenacted July 30, 1947, chap. 392, 61 Stat.
670, codified as amended at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2000)).
22. Christopher R. Drahozal, "Unfair" Arbitration Clauses, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 695, 696
(citing Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 631).
23. See Jeremiah A. Byme, Note, "Another Day" Has Come and Gone: Circuit City Stores,
Inc. v. Adams, Application of the Federal Arbitration Act to Employment Disputes, 40 BRANDEIS
L.J. 163, 170-71 (2001).
24. See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).
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sion that authorizes this enforcement is found in § 2 of the FAA, which
states:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or contract evidenc-
ing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a con-
troversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction ... shall
be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds exist
at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.
25
The Supreme Court has interpreted this section broadly to uphold
enforcement of arbitration for federal statutory claims, 26 and also to pre-
empt state laws attempting to invalidate or restrict arbitration. 27 Accord-
ing to the Court, § 2 evidences a "congressional declaration of a liberal
federal policy favoring arbitration agreements, notwithstanding any
state's substantive or procedural policies to the contrary. 28
In recent years, the Supreme Court has issued a series of landmark
decisions favoring enforceability of arbitration agreements. 29 These deci-
sions, culminating last year with Circuit City, have effectively turned the
tide on the "longstanding judicial hostility to arbitration agreements" that
Congress sought to overcome with the FAA. 30 So powerful has its en-
dorsement been, that the Court has been criticized by some observers as
31
being too extreme in its enthusiasm for arbitration. Yet, while the
Court's pro-arbitration stance does provoke some concern, particularly
regarding the implications of arbitration in the employment context, it is
safe to say that in recent years, the Court has been unwavering in its
preference for "resolving difficult questions in favor of arbitration."
32
In 1984, the Court issued one of its earliest pro-arbitration deci-
sions.33 In Southland Corp. v. Keating,3 4 the Court established the FAA's
25. Id.
26. Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 89 (2000) ("[Wje have recognized
that federal statutory claims can be appropriately resolved through arbitration, and we have enforced
agreements to arbitrate that involve such claims.").
27. Allied-Bruce Terminix, 513 U.S. at 272 ("[S]tate courts cannot apply state statutes that
invalidate arbitration agreements.").
28. Schwartz, supra note 20, at 86.
29. See, e.g., Green Tree, 531 U.S. at 82; Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky
Reefer, 515 U.S. 528, 541 (1995); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 23 (1991);
Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 481 (1989); Shearson/Am.
Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 234 (1987); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-
Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 636 (1985); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16 (1984).
30. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 24.
31. The Court's favorable treatment of arbitration has been characterized as "creat[ing] a
monster" and exalting arbitration agreements to "a privileged place in the contractual hierarchy,
trumping both federal and state statutory rights and, in some circuits, even curtailing the powers of
federal agencies to enforce civil rights." Schwartz, supra note 20, at 36; Leading Cases, supra note
10, at 508.
32. Schwartz, supra note 20, at 82.
33. Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 16.
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preemptive effect on state law, holding that § 2 of the Act strips states of
the authority to "require a judicial forum for the resolution of claims
which the contracting parties agreed to resolve by arbitration. 35 For the
first time, the Court held that the FAA applies not only in federal courts,
but in state courts as well.36 As a result, the FAA now preempts all state
laws that are hostile to arbitration or that attempt to impose conditions on
the enforceability of these agreements.
37
Relying on Southland, the Court in Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc.
v. Dobson38 broadly interpreted the FAA's language as proof of intent by
Congress to exercise its commerce power to the fullest, thereby invali-
dating any state law contrary to the enforcement of arbitration.39 The
Court reaffirmed its pro-arbitration stance by applying the FAA to "an
intrastate contract to provide termite extermination services to an Ala-
bama homeowner, thereby preempting an Alabama statute making pre-
dispute arbitration agreements unenforceable." 40 This decision made it
clear that few contracts would escape the expansive reach of the FAA.4'
In Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,42 the Court issued a
powerful endorsement of arbitration.43 The Court rejected a number of
arguments about arbitration's intrinsic unfairness, calling these com-
plaints "far out of step with [the Court's] current strong endorsement of
the federal statutes favoring this method of resolving disputes." 4 Reject-
ing the suggestion that arbitration was inferior to a judicial remedy, the
Court stated that, "by agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does
not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to
their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum.
4 5
These influential Supreme Court pro-arbitration decisions sanc-
tioned the use of arbitration and made it clear that the Court would not
34. 465 U.S. 1.
35. Id. at 10.
36. Id. at 16.
37. Id.
38. 513 U.S. 265 (1995).
39. Allied-Bruce Terminix, 513 U.S. at 277. The Court noted that there was no reason to
overrule its decision in Southland because "[niothing significant has changed in the 10 years
subsequent to Southland; no later cases have eroded Southland's authority; and no unforeseen
practical problems have arisen. Moreover, in the interim, private parties have likely written contracts
relying on Southland ... and we find it inappropriate to reconsider what is by now well-established
law." Id. at 272.
40. Schwartz, supra note 20, at 88 (referring to Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 628 So.
2d 354, 355 (Ala. 1993)).
41. Id. at 274.
42. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
43. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 30
44. Id. (citing Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 U.S. at 481).
45. Id. at 26 (citing Mitsubishi 473 U.S. at 628).
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entertain generalized attacks on the adequacy or applicability of arbitra-
tion.46
B. Benefits of Arbitration in the Workplace
These key Supreme Court decisions have sparked intense debate
among the courts and commentators alike. Like Southland, Allied-Bruce,
and Gilmer before it, Circuit City has been divisive, specifically concern-
ing the merits of arbitration in the workplace.
Arbitration is frequently praised for offering advantages to both
sides of any claim.47 Even in the employment arena, where parties tend
to be on unequal footing, the Supreme Court has rejected the notion that
the advantages of arbitration somehow cease to exist.48 Generally recog-
nized as being less expensive and faster than the judicial system, arbitra-
tion is also praised for its private nature and its ability to "maintain good-
will between the parties." 9
Corporate defendants too find arbitration particularly attractive for
several reasons. 50 First, since corporations are particularly vulnerable to
unfavorable publicity, they probably benefit most from the private nature
of arbitration.51 Second, the nature of corporations' disputes against mi-
nor players-such as employees, customers, and smaller businesses-
generally involve small sums of money and tend to be patterned and re-
petitive. 52 Such disputes are especially well suited to the "informality of
arbitration," which limits discovery and thus requires less preparation
time "for hearing and presenting evidence."53 This allows corporate de-
fendants to avoid the generally higher costs associated with litigation.
54
Attorneys' fees on the plaintiff's side are typically lower for the same
reasons. 55 In arbitration, where a prevailing plaintiff may be entitled to
46. Schwartz, supra note 20, at 104.
47. See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 122-23 (2001); see also Byrne,
supra note 23, at 164 (explaining the benefits provided by the enactment of the FAA, namely less
expense to both parties involved and a speedier resolution to the issue at hand).
48. See Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 123; see also Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 32-33 (upholding the
enforceability of arbitration agreements, despite "unequal bargaining power between employers and
employees," so long as there is no indication that the employee was "coerced or defrauded into
agreeing" to arbitration).
49. Byrne, supra note 23, at 182.
50. See Schwartz, supra note 20, at 60.
51. See Byrne, supra note 23, at 183 ("Arbitration proceedings are mostly conducted in
private, and no opinion is released to the public.").






recover attorneys' fees, the corporate defendant benefits by limiting ex-
penses in the event an unfavorable judgment is rendered.56
Additionally, while statistics indicate that employees are more likely
to recover damages in arbitration than in a judicial forum, 57 "there is a
,,58
general perception that arbitrators give smaller awards than juries.
Because arbitrators typically come from the business community, corpo-
rate defendants may feel they have a better chance of gaining sympathy,
"if not downright bias," from arbitrators. 59 The Supreme Court, however,
stated in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.60 that
it refused "to indulge the presumption that the parties and arbitral body
conducting a proceeding [would] be unable or unwilling to retain compe-
tent, conscientious, and impartial arbitrators.' Yet, critics point out that
it is no secret "individual arbitrators have an economic stake in being
selected again, and their judgment may well be shaded by a desire to
build a 'track record' of decisions that corporate repeat-users will view
approvingly."62
C. Criticisms of Arbitration in the Workplace
Despite a strong pro-arbitration climate, not everyone endorses this
dispute resolution mechanism. 63 In particular, concern is mounting over
the increased usage of arbitration agreements in the employment con-
text.64 Critics insist that employees "are particularly deserving of protec-
tion from compelled arbitration" and that, in the employment context, the
potential for an unjust result is heightened. 65 These criticisms stem from
the notion that, for a variety of reasons, arbitration is an unfair and inap-




57. See Byrne, supra note 23, at 182 (citing Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc., 170 F.3d 1, 7 n.4 (1st Cir. 1999)).
58. Schwartz, supra note 20, at 60. Schwartz discusses findings that suggest that virtually all
employment defense firms counsel employers to adopt arbitration policies as a means of reducing
exposure and controlling risk. He cites a survey of sixty-two arbitration awards in securities industry
employment cases which confirmed the 'intuitive' assumption that arbitrating employment disputes
'before a panel of arbitrators . would generally provide a more favorable forum for employers."'
Id. at 63 nn.89-92.
59. Id. (noting, for example, that arbitrators for security industry disputes are drawn from the
securities industry itself).
60. 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
61. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 634.
62. Schwartz, supra note 20, at 60-61.
63. See Drahozal, supra note 22, at 705.
64. See Schwartz, supra note 20, at 38.
65. Id.
66. See Drahozal, supra note 22, at 705.
2002]
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Critics frequently contend that because the vast majority of arbitra-
tion clauses are in adhesion contracts, employees do not really consent to
arbitration.67 Adhesion contracts are typically standard form agreements
between parties with unequal bargaining power.68 One party typically
drafts the agreement and presents it to the other "party on a take-it-or-
leave-it basis."69 Critics argue that when an employee agrees to arbitra-
tion, she is either unaware of what she is agreeing to,70 or she has no
choice but to agree to the mandatory arbitration language because it is a
condition of employment.7 t
Other attacks on the fairness of arbitration revolve around arbitra-
tion's practical operation. Opponents argue that the procedures are biased
in favor of employers. 72 The take-it-or-leave-it nature of arbitration, crit-
ics argue, puts employees in a vulnerable position.7 3 Steep costs to plain-
tiffs, the potential for biased arbitrators, limited discovery, "lack of an
appeal," and "the unavailability of class relief" are common arguments
asserted by those who oppose arbitration.74
Pointing to behavioral evidence, opponents argue that the benefits
of arbitration do not run both ways-that arbitration clearly favors em-
ployers.75 As proof, empirical data shows that when workplace disputes
arise, employers usually seek to compel arbitration, while employees
prefer to litigate.7 6
It has also been suggested that the Circuit City ruling effectively
diminishes the "regulatory impact of statutory and common law doc-
trines. ' 77 Pointing out that corporate defendants have been most eager to
embrace mandatory arbitration, critics object to the deregulatory impact
67. See id.
68. See Schwartz, supra note 20, at 55.
69. Id.
70. See id.
71. See Drahozal, supra note 22, at 706.
72. See id. at 705 (noting "typical characteristics of an arbitration proceeding ... uniformly
disadvantage individuals").
73. See Christine M. Reilly, Achieving Knowing and Voluntary Consent in Pre-Dispute
Mandatory Arbitration Agreements at the Contracting Stage of Employment, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1203,
1234-35 (2002).
74. Drahozal, supra note 22, at 705. Critics of arbitration point to the behavior of the parties
involved in employment disputes and suggest that, unlike employers, individuals who are compelled
to sign arbitration agreements typically prefer to take their claims to court once a dispute arises. Id.
at 748. But see Byrne, supra note 23, at 168 (explaining that, ironically, it is many of these exact
features of arbitration that are advocated as benefits by proponents).
75. See Schwartz, supra note 20, at 62.
76. See id. at 62. The author's survey of forty published federal cases involving arbitration of
employment disputes over a two-year period revealed that the employer moved to compel arbitration
in forty out of forty cases. See id. n.88.
77. Schwartz, supra note 20, at 55.
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of these agreements in the employment context. 78 Applying arbitration to
important federal regulatory statutes, such as those that establish dis-
crimination claims, makes arbitration attractive to the corporate defen-
dant looking to limit costs and negative public exposure, and has the
dangerous effect of "self-deregulation. 79
Despite vocal concern from critics of arbitration, however, human
resource departments utilize arbitration agreements with increasing fre-
quency. 80 This widespread use, along with strong backing from the Su-
preme Court, has "established the [FAA] as a major piece of legislation
affecting the careers of many Americans.
81
III. CIRCUIT CITY STORES, INC. V. ADAMS
82
In Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, the Supreme Court decided
whether the FAA applied to agreements to arbitrate employment dis-
putes, or whether an exclusionary provision in the Act required deference
to judicial resolution of these matters. 83 The Court determined that the
critical issue was to what extent § 1 of the FAA intended to cover the
arbitrability of employment disputes.84 Section 1 provides, in pertinent
part, that "nothing herein contained shall apply to contracts of employ-
ment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers en-
gaged in foreign or interstate commerce. 85 The language of this provi-
sion leaves room for interpretation as to whether it exempts all employ-
ment contracts from the Act's coverage, or only employment contracts of
interstate transportation workers. 86 With the exception of the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, however, every Circuit to address the issue
had limited the § 1 exclusion to transportation workers. 87 The Supreme
Court approached this issue in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane
Corp.,88 but stopped short of resolving it since the dispute in Gilmer
stemmed from a securities registration application held not to be an em-
ployment contract.89 Leaving the issue unresolved in Gilmer, the Court in
Circuit City interpreted § 1 and ruled on its applicability to employment
matters. 90
78. Id. at 62.
79. Id.
80. See Byrne, supra note 23, at 167.
81. Id. at 164.
82. 532 U.S. 105 (2001).
83. See Leading Cases, supra note 10, at 508.
84. See Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 109.
85. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
86. See Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 109.
87. See id.
88. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
89. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 25 n.2.
90. Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 113 ("Concluding that the application [in Gilmer] was not a
'contract of employment' at all, we found it unnecessary to reach the meaning of § 1.").
2002]
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In its holding, the Court limited the § 1 exemption to transportation
workers. 9' In arriving at this decision, the Court rejected the Ninth Cir-
cuit's position that "all employment contracts are excluded from the
FAA '92 and embraced a narrow reading of the statutory language.93 The
Court justified its interpretation utilizing both a textual analysis of the
language of § 1, as well as an examination of congressional intent. 94 In-
terpreting the phrase "any other class of workers engaged in commerce,"
the Court applied "the maxim ejusdem generis," which means "where
general words follow specific words in a statutory enumeration, the gen-
eral words are construed to embrace only objects similar in nature to
those objects enumerated by the preceding specific words." 95 This logic
supports the Court's reasoning that the general clause "any other class of
workers" should be defined by reference to the specific categories of
"seamen" and "railroad employees" mentioned before it.96
Justice Souter's dissent, in which Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and
Breyer joined, found fault with the rule of statutory interpretation
adopted by the majority, insisting instead that the better maxim was "ex
abundanti cautela," meaning "abundance of caution." 97 The dissent con-
tended that by applying ejusdem generis, the majority ignored the idea
that "a whole may differ from the sum of its parts. 98 The dissent argued
that § 1 should be read to exclude all employment contracts from the
reach of the FAA, and that the words "any other class of workers" should
be read as a catchall phrase encompassing workers of all kinds.99
While the decision in Circuit City focused primarily on interpretive
issues surrounding the meaning of § 1, the Court also undertook an
analysis of the basic coverage authorized under § 2, the primary substan-
tive provision of the FAA.1°° Rejecting the argument that the term
"transaction" in § 2 is limited to commercial contracts, the Court rea-
soned that if § 2 did not apply to employment contracts, there would be
no reason to specify certain types of employment in the § 1 exclusion
provision.' 0' The Court went on to explain that the words "involving
commerce" evidenced Congress' intent to "exercise its full commerce
power in the coverage provision of the FAA., 10 2 In short, the Court rea-
91. Seeid. at 109.
92. Id. at 110-11.
93. See id. at 18.
94. See id. at 114.
95. Id. at 114-15.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 140 (Souter, J., dissenting).
98. Leading Cases, supra note 10, at 513.
99. Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 138-39 (Souter, J., dissenting).
100. See id. at 113-16.
101. Id. at 113.
102. Byrne, supra note 23, at 173.
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soned that a narrow reading of § 1, together with a broad reading of § 2,
places employment contracts squarely within the scope of the FAA.' 03
IV. ANALYSIS
The Court's statutory interpretation of § I in Circuit City resolved
the question left unanswered in Gilmer.' 4 The ruling made it clear that,
with the narrow exception of interstate transportation workers, the FAA
could be invoked to completely enforce arbitration agreements in the
employment context.'0 5 Circuit City has been described as "the case that
would define the future of arbitration in the American workplace."',0 6 An
article in the Wall Street Journal, following this decision, described Cir-
cuit City as the Court's "biggest pro-business decision," signaling "a
very good year for big corporations."'10 7 With the backing of the Supreme
Court, arbitration has become the "cornerstone of dispute resolution pro-
grams." 108 To be sure, Circuit City has secured a place for arbitration in
the employment arena, and the effects, not surprisingly, have prompted
concern among those who oppose its use in this context.
A. The practical effects of Circuit City
The Court's endorsement of the broad enforcement powers of the
FAA has paved the way for increased usage of arbitration agreements in
employment contracts. °9 These agreements "have become increasingly
commonplace in a number of fields of commerce."" 0 From the financial
industry to the health care and insurance industries, binding arbitration
often is a condition of service or employment."
1
Before the enactment of the FAA, arbitration was "the sole province
of trade association members" or "limited to contracts between large
corporations."1 2 Shipping and railroad workers, the class of employees
enumerated in § 1 of the FAA, constituted a relatively small number of
employees who operated under established arbitration procedures.
13
Today, however, experts estimate that binding arbitration agreements
103. See id. at 174-75.
104. See Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 113; see also Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 25.
105. See Byrne, supra note 23, at 167.
106. Id.
107. Robert S. Greenberger, Businesses See Gains in High-Court Term, WALL ST. J., June 29,
2001, at B4.
108. Byrne, supra note 23, at 166.
109. See Schwartz, supra note 20, at 53.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 53-54.
112. Drahozal, supra note 22, at 704.
113. See Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 121. The Shipping Commissioners Act of 1872, the
Transportation Act of 1920, and the Railway Labor Act of 1926 established procedures for resolving
employment disputes between seamen and railroad employees and their employers. Id.
20021
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cover as many as five million nonunion workers nationwide. 14 And, in
the wake of Circuit City, commentators predict that "use [of these agree-
ments] will only increase as corporate drafters of form contracts catch on
to its advantages."'
1 5
Numerous employment organizations have issued statements re-
garding arbitration agreements in the employment context. The Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), for example, issued
an official policy statement against pre-dispute arbitration agreements for
employment discrimination disputes. 1 6 Staunchly opposed to mandatory
arbitration in the employment context, the EEOC's position stems from
concern over agreements that require employees, as a condition of em-
ployment, to "give up their right to pursue employment discrimination
claims in court." ' 1 7 The EEOC maintains that "the courts play an essen-
tial role in enforcing the civil rights laws," and that if employees are
forced to resolve their claims in an arbitral forum, "there is no public
accountability for decisions that are made or for employers who violate
the law."' '
18
The EEOC claimed a recent victory in its battle against mandatory
arbitration in the employment context. In January 2002, the Supreme
Court ruled in EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc.119 that the EEOC was not
barred from pursuing legal relief on behalf of an employee who had
agreed to arbitrate employment disputes with his employer.12 0 The Court
held that "the EEOC does not stand in the employee's shoes,1.21 and that
federal statutory authority permits the EEOC to "pursue victim-specific
relief regardless of the forum that the employer and employee have cho-
sen to resolve their disputes.'
122
The EEOC is not the only organization with a very public stance on
the issue of workplace arbitration. The National Employment Law Asso-
ciation ("NELA") has also responded by pressuring arbitration providers
114. Robert S. Greenberger, Justices Back Arbitration Use In Work Arena, WALL ST. J., Mar.
22, 2001, at A3 (citing data from the American Arbitration Association, the largest provider of
dispute resolution services).
115. Schwartz, supra note 20, at 54.
116. See EEOC Notice No. 915.002 (July 10, 1997), available at
http://www.eeoc.gov/docs/mandarb.html [hereinafter EEOC Notice]; see also Press Release, EEOC,
EEOC Releases Policy Statement on Mandatory Binding Arbitration (July 10, 1997), available at
http:/www.eeoc.gov/press/7-10-97.html (describing the policy statement and the basic purpose of the
EEOC). The EEOC is the federal agency responsible for interpreting and defending the public's
interest in fair employment practices.
117. EEOC Notice, supra note 116.
118. Press Release, supra note 116.
119. 122 S. Ct. 754 (2002).
120. Waffle House, 122 S. Ct. at 765.
121. Id. at 766.
122. Id. at 765.
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into refusing to take part in compulsory pre-dispute arbitration.123 Hoping
to discourage employers from utilizing these agreements, NELA threat-
ened "to not appoint arbitrators (when its own members had the ability to
choose arbitrators) from those services that were willing to be written
into such employment contracts."
'124
Even pro-arbitration groups, like the National Academy of Arbitra-
tors ("NAA"),125 have responded to the growing popularity of arbitration
agreements in the workplace. These groups recognize that "the vitality of
arbitration is contingent upon a continued confidence in the inherent
fairness of the institution."1 26 A task force assembled by NAA issued a
protocol setting forth recommendations to ensure fair arbitration
proceedings. 127 Members of NELA, the American Bar Association, the
American Arbitration Association, and the American Civil Liberties Un-
ion signed this protocol. 28 Furthermore, the Commission on the Future
of Worker-Management Relations (the "Dunlop Commission") has also
endorsed arbitration, while at the same time cautioning against issues of
potential unfairness. 129 In fact, the Dunlop Commission developed its
own recommendations designed to alleviate concerns about the fairness
of the arbitration process. 130
While these assorted recommendations, protocols, and guidelines
earnestly strive to ensure basic fairness for arbitration in the workplace,
they are merely advisory.' 3' Courts do not require employers "to abide by
these market-spawned rules of the fairer road," and their practical effect
on the arbitration process "remains to be seen."'' 32 The Federal Arbitra-
tion Act itself, however, includes an enumerated list of grounds for
123. Edward A. Dauer, Judicial Policing of Consumer Arbitration, 1 PEPP. DIsP. RESOL. L.J.
91, 102 (2000); see http://www.nela.orglabout/about mission.htm (describing NELA as an
organization of more than 3,400 plaintiffs' attorneys who "represent individual employees in cases
involving employment discrimination, wrongful termination, employee benefits, and other
employment related matters") (last visited Jan. 5, 2002).
124. Dauer, supra note 123, at 102.
125. A non-profit professional organization of arbitrators founded in 1947 with approximately
625 members. See http://www.naarb.org/whatis.html (last visited Jan. 5, 2002).
126. Byme, supra note 23, at 185.
127. A Due Process Protocol for Mediation and Arbitration of Statutory Disputes Arising out of
the Employment Relationship (May 9, 1995), at http://www.naarb.org/protocol.html.
128. Id.
129. Byme, supra note 23, at 185. The Dunlop Commission is appointed by the U.S. Secretary
of Labor and has championed arbitration as "an efficient way to resolve employment disputes." Id.
130. Id.
131. Dauer, supra note 123, at 102.
132. Id.
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which a fundamentally unfair arbitration award can be overturned.
133
These grounds include:
(1) Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue
means.
(2) Where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitra-
tors, or either of them.
(3) Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to
postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refus-
ing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy;
or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party
have been prejudiced.
(4) Where the arbitrators exceed their powers, or so imperfectly
executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the
subject matter submitted was not made. 134
These "built-in invalidation mechanisms,, 135 in the FAA address many of
the very same concerns that arbitration and employment groups are seek-
ing to resolve with their aspirational protocols and standards.
B. Historical and Policy Implications
The Circuit City majority relied on the significance of the FAA's
language to arrive at its decision.' 36 Critics have disapproved of the
analysis in Circuit City, arguing that the Court relied too heavily on a
textual analysis and ignored policy considerations and legislative his-
tory. 137 With respect to this issue, the Court justified its approach by cit-
ing the limited amount of available legislative history.1 38 The Court also
noted that it would "not resort to legislative history to cloud a statutory
text that is clear.,
139
The Court's approach has raised problems, sparking much debate
over what legislative history is available and the implications this infor-
mation would have had on the outcome of Circuit City. One critic's arti-
cle suggests "the Court's well-known predilection for textual analysis
may take precedence over what are almost certainly its policy prefer-
ences."
140
133. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 10(a)(1)-(4) (2000).
134. Id.
135. Byme, supra note 23, at 186.
136. See Leading Cases, supra note 10, at 514; Byrne, supra note 23, at 179.
137. Leading Cases, supra note 10, at 514-17.
138. Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 119.
139. Id.
140. Leading Cases, supra note 10, at 508.
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The dissenting opinions in Circuit City, authored by Justice Stevens
and Justice Souter respectively, argued that the appropriate way to de-
termine congressional intent is to examine the legislative history at the
time the FAA was enacted.141 For example, Justice Stevens argued:
[Nleither the history of the drafting of the original bill by the ABA,
nor the records of the deliberations in Congress during the years pre-
ceding the ultimate enactment of the Act in 1925, contains any evi-
dence that the proponents of the legislation intended it to apply to
agreements affecting employment.14
2
Others argue that "the historical roots of arbitration and of the FAA" fail
to support a rule that would enforce arbitration agreements in contracts
"marked by disparities in bargaining power, knowledge and interests."' 43
Although a textual analysis controlled the result of the majority
opinion in Circuit City, limited legislative history does support the
Court's decision to apply the FAA to employment contracts.144 Counter-
ing arguments to the contrary, commentators note that "[n]othing in leg-
islative history conclusively lends itself to a broad reading of § 1 .
They argue that "when considered in conjunction with the plain meaning
of the statutory language and the FAA's underlying purpose, the limited
legislative history indicates Congress' intent to cover employment con-
tracts of all workers except seamen, railroad employees, and those work-
ers engaged in the actual movement of goods in interstate commerce.
', 46
The Court reasoned that employment disputes for these specific catego-
ries of workers were already governed by grievance procedures under
federal law. 14 7 Justifying its reasons for limiting the § 1 exclusion to in-
terstate transportation workers, the Court offered that it "is reasonable to
assume that Congress excluded 'seamen' and 'railroad employees' from
the FAA for the simple reason that it did not wish to unsettle established
or developing statutory dispute resolution schemes covering specific
workers."' 148 Still, some insist that if the Court had focused more on legis-
lative history, and less on statutory syntax, the Court may have reached a
different outcome in Circuit City.
149
141. See Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 125-29 (Stevens, J., dissenting), 133-35 (Souter, J.,
dissenting).
142. Id. at 126 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
143. Schwartz, supra note 20, at 39.
144. Byrne, supra note 23, at 179.
145. Id. at 181.
146. Id.
147. Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 121.
148. Id.
149. See Leading Cases, supra note 10, at 515.
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CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decision in Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams
is consistent with an already strong federal policy favoring arbitration.
50
Holding that the FAA applies to employment contracts, the Supreme
Court sanctioned the use of pre-dispute arbitration as a valid mechanism
for dealing with employment disputes. Because of the strength of this
endorsement, and the advantages arbitration provides to corporate defen-
dants, Circuit City concerns critics who insist the FAA was not intended
to resolve employment disputes. 15' Critics object to the nature of arbitra-
tion agreements, and the fact that, typically, employers include arbitra-
tion clauses in adhesion contracts offered to employees on a "take it or
leave it" basis. Some argue that "employees, as a class, are particularly
deserving of protection from compelled arbitration,' 52 and that, for
many reasons, arbitration agreements are overreaching. Yet, despite the
many concerns it raises, arbitration has found a big supporter in the Su-
preme Court, and the Circuit City decision has secured a place for arbi-
tration in the employment field.
Kristin McCandless*
150. See Byrne, supra note 23, at 181.
151. Schwartz, supra note 20, at 38.
152. Id.
* JD Candidate, 2004, University of Denver College of Law. The author dedicates this
article in memory of A.L. Heward.
[Vol. 80:1
